Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Mervyn King thinks helicopter drops blur the distinction between political and economic decisions. He’s wrong.




I’m a fan of Mervyn King. But in this speech in October 2012 he made a few mistakes. He pointed out (correctly) that helicopter drops come the same thing as merging monetary and fiscal stimulus. See paragraph starting “There has been some talk….”.
However, he claimed that if fiscal decisions (traditionally the responsibility of politicians) are combined with monetary stimulus decisions (traditionally the responsibility of central banks), it follows that political considerations will then influence money printing, and second, that central banks will be able to influence political decisions, like what proportion of GDP is allocated to public spending. As he put it (I’ve put “King quotes” in green):
“I want to explain why it is important to distinguish between “good” and “bad” money creation. In essence, the argument is very simple. “Good” money creation is where an independent central bank creates enough money in the economy to achieve price stability. “Bad” money creation is where the government chooses the amount of money that is created in order to finance its expenditure…. Excessive money creation leads to accelerating inflation and ultimately the collapse of the currency…… But just as it is crucial that governments do not control the printing of money, so too the unelected central bank must not determine the levels of taxes and public spending.”
Well that does not need to happen, as pointed out by Positive Money and co-authors. That is, under a “helicopter drop” regime (i.e. a regime where government and central bank simply create new money and spend it as required (and/or cut taxes)), the electorate and politicians can remain in TOTAL CONTROL of strictly political decisions, like what proportion of GDP is allocated to public spending and what the make up of that spending should be.
AT THE SAME TIME, some sort of committee of economists (something like the existing Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee would do) can decide to what stimulus is needed: that is, said committee can decide to what extent government spending should exceed government income.
Having decided that government spending should exceed government income by £X, government (if it was going to behave in a democratic manner) would allocate the £X to public spending and tax cuts according to the ratio decided by the electorate at the most recent election. But there’d be nothing to stop politicians ignoring the electorate’s wishes: those anti-democracy, lying scum bags we call “politicians” often ignore election manifestos. And they’d be free to behave in a similarly dishonest manner under the regime advocated by Positive Money and friends.

King’s third claim: stimulus reversal.
A third claim made by King was that in a merged monetary and fiscal stimulus regime it  would be more difficult to REVERSE stimulus. As he put it:
“It is peculiar, to say the least, that some of the same people who believe that the Governor of the Bank is too powerful also believe that he should stand on the steps of Threadneedle Street distributing £50 notes – a policy which you will appreciate is rather hard to reverse. For the same reason, the Bank could not countenance any suggestion that we cancel our holdings of gilts. The Bank must have the ability  to reverse its policy – to sell gilts and withdraw money from the economy – when that becomes  necessary. Otherwise, we run the risk of losing control over monetary conditions.”   
Now the problem with King’s “reverse” point is that he admits that “print and spend” or a “helicopter drop” equals combining monetary and fiscal stimulus. Thus it is hard to see why reversing helicopter drops should be more difficult than reversing monetary and/or fiscal stimulus.

King’s fourth claim: central banks must have a stock of government debt.
As regards his claim that without a “holding of gilts”, the Bank of England would be unable to influence what he calls “monetary decisions”, that is not true. That is, even if there were no government debt, there’d be nothing to stop a central bank that wanted to cool down an overheating economy announcing that it was prepared to borrow at above the going rate of interest.
That ploy might not he legal under the prevailing legislation in some countries, but that’s a minor technical or legal point that can be changed.
As to where a central bank would get the money from to pay interest  for the latter “cooling off” ploy, that is no problem. First, central banks can print money. Second, interest is not normally paid till twelve months after governments or central banks initially borrow. And third, the latter twelve month period probably gives time for the above mentioned MPC type committee to tell government it’s got to raise taxes and/or cut spending so as to raise the funds with which to pay the above mentioned interest.

Is monetary policy compatible with helicopter drops?
The latter points might seem illogical in that if the purpose of this post is advocate combining monetary and fiscal policy, why is monetary policy ALONE being considered? Well, the first purpose is to rebut King’s claim that central banks must have a stock of government debt.
Second, if a country adopts helicopter drops as its main weapon, that does not necessarily rule out monetary policy or interest rate changes as a secondary weapon to be used in emergencies.


Monday, February 18, 2013

Why are banksters so shy of making a profit?



Contradicting someone, or demolishing their arguments can be difficult. Much better, where possible, is to prove they are contradicting themselves. Here’s where banksters contradict themselves.
Bank CEOs, bank shareholders, etc are always keen to persuade us that lending standards which others claim to be a risk, are in fact not a risk, and hence that we should have lax lending standards. The claim is of course a pack of lies: banksters’ real aim, as we all know, is to enjoy the profits of lax lending as long as that works, while taxpayers foot the bill when it doesn’t.
Now why doesn’t the state call banksters’ bluff?
I.e. how about the state saying to bank shareholders, “OK, if the risks of lax lending REALLY ARE negligible, then you won’t mind pledging your entire worldly wealth to back the claim, will you? I.e. if your bank goes bust, we (the state) grab your house and ALL YOUR ASSETS so as to put your bank back on its feet. (Or instead of anyone’s entire worldly wealth being pledged, perhaps the amount of assets pledged could be some multiple of each bank shareholder’s shareholding.)
Indeed, we (the state) will even pay you a very small dividend in exchange for the latter pledge. E.g. we’ll pay you say 0.01% of the value of your pledged assets per annum as a reward for the invaluable service you’re providing. And how can you possibly turn down the offer: after all, the risks are non-existent (according to you), and you get an extra 0.01% return on your assets. Why would you turn down the offer?”
Moreover, the latter system would be very similar to the system employed by Lloyds, (the London based insurance entity). Lloyds “names” pledge their worldly wealth, and get a dividend in good years; while in exceptionally bad years, they lose a fortune.
Reason banksters would turn down the latter sure-fire way of making money is of course that it’s not sure fire. And they know it. They’re lying. They’re contradicting themselves.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Professional economists are tumbling to the merits of helicoptering. What took them so long?



E.g. see here and here.
As advocates of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) have been pointing out for some time, the government / central bank machine (GCBM) is not financially constrained. That is, it can simply print money and spend it into the economy (and/or cut  taxes) whenever it wants.
To be more accurate, the debt and deficit are no constraint whatever: the only constraint is inflation.
Helicopter drops simply combine fiscal and monetary stimulus, as indeed Mervyn King pointed out. (See para starting “There has been some talk..”).
Another professional economist to get interested in helicoptering is Simon Wren-Lewis.
While King agrees that helicoptering equals combining monetary and fiscal stimulus, he is not in favour of actually effecting the combination: i.e. he favours retaining the split. But his reasons are hopeless. I’ll explain why in a few days time hopefully.
For now, though, far as I’m concerned, the reasons for separating fiscal from monetary stimulus are hilariously stupid. I set them out a year ago here. But here they are again (re-phrased a bit).
1. Adjusting interest rates is a form of monetary policy, BUT interest rate adjustments are DISTORTIONARY. An interest rate change works only via households or firms which are significantly reliant on variable rate loans: i.e. those reliant on FIXED rate loans or not reliant on loans at all are not affected by an interest rate change. Thus this policy makes no more sense than boosting an economy only via people with black hair, with blondes, red-heads, etc waiting for a trickle-down effect.
2. QE, another form of monetary policy, has the same defect: it works only via a limited proportion of the population, that is, the rich.
3. The idea that there is a close relationship between interest rates and the ACTUAL availability of credit has been shown to be TOTAL NONSENSE over the last two years. That is, rates are currently at record low levels, but banks are reluctant to lend.
4. There is no relationship between central bank base rates and the rates charged by credit card operators. Also see here.
5. The Radcliffe Report on monetary policy in the U.K. published in 1960 concluded that ‘there can be no reliance on interest rate policy as a major short-term stabiliser of demand’.
6. Low interest rates allegedly encourage investment. Unfortunately those making investments look at LONG TERM rates, not the fact that the central bank has recently cut rates and will probably raise them again in two years’ time. And that applies both to firms investing in productive capacity and people who borrow with a view to buying houses. Although there is one exception to the latter point, as follows.
While most people will not buy houses just because interest rates have dropped for a couple of years, there ARE those NINJA mortgage suckers who bought houses on the basis of near zero interests for the first year or two. I.e. there ARE idiots out there. So in that the “low interest rates encourages investment” argument DOES WORK, it works by encouraging idiots to behave irresponsibly!!! Now that’s a ringing endorsement for “low interest rates encourage investment” argument - I don’t think.
7. An interest rate reduction is an inducement to borrow and invest in assets, which tends to cause asset price bubbles. In contrast, a straightforward change in government net spending has less of a “bubble blowing” effect. That is, if the additional net spending is directed at a cross section of the population (not just the wealthy), there will not be a significant asset bubble effect.
8. The optimum price for borrowed money (i.e. the optimum rate of interest) is determined by the same sort of factors that determine the optimum price for concrete, steel or any other commodity: supply and demand. To put that in economics jargon, the rate of interest is optimised when the marginal disutility of forgone consumption by savers equals the marginal utility or marginal benefit from the investments that those savers fund.
If government interferes with this free market rate of interest, then the total amount invested will not be optimum. GDP will not be maximised.
9. Low interest rates can have a DEFLATIONARY effect (pointed out by Warren Mosler). If rates are cut, the central bank will then pay out less by way of interest. That is, less new money will be injected into the private sector. (But that effect depends on the rules governing the relevant central bank, Treasury, etc. To illustrate, in some countries a rate reduction may NOT automatically reduce the above injection. That is, the reduction may be treated as a reduced budgetary expense for the Treasury, which in turn is expected to collect less tax to compensate. In this case the above deflationary effect would not operate.)
10. Interest rates charged by commercial banks for mortgagtes etc can be slow to respond to changes in central bank base rates.
11. The idea that reduced interest rates encourage investment is rendered irrelevant by the fact that in a recession, more investment is exactly what is NOT needed. In recessions (certainly in SHORT recessions) there is more than the usual amount of capital equipment lying idle! Of course it takes TIME to manufacture or create real investments like machinery or factories, and assuming an economy will return to trend growth shortly after a recession, employers need to make sure they are not SHORT of capital equipment after a recession. But employers do not need governments to tell them this. Nor will irrelevant little inducements like 2% changes in interest rates do much to optimise any given employer’s investment strategy.
12. X. Some research done by G. L. S. Shackle concluded that the connection between interest changes and investment was weak. The entrepreneurs questioned said that estimated profits “must greatly exceed the cost of borrowing if the investment in question is to be made”.
13. The effect of interest rate adjustments is hindered by foreign currency movements. E.g. a rise in interest rates designed to damp down an overheated economy draws foreign capital into the relevant county, which reduces the desired effect. In contrast, a straight cut in government spending (a la MMT) has the opposite effect, if anything, on internationally mobile capital. That is, given a cut in demand in a particular country, capital will tend to leave the country in search of better opportunities elsewhere.
14. Keynes said, “I am now somewhat skeptical of the success of a merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of interest...it seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation of the marginal efficiency of different types of capital...will be too great to be offset by any practicable changes in the rate of interest." Keynes’s General Theory – near the end of Ch 12. (h/t to skeptonomist).
15. A novel argument in favour of using monetary policy alone was produced recently by Nick Rowe. This is that fiscal is already doing a huge amount, in the form of taking thousands of micro economic decisions a day - like deciding where to build bridges, to cite Rowe’s example. Thus, allegedly, we cannot impose more burdens on fiscal.
Well the answer to that argument is that the amount of work currently being done by any system has nothing to do with whether it should be given more work to do, or whether the latter work should be allocated to some other system. For example the fact that the military is already spending billions on warships, aircraft and so on has nothing to do with whether the military or the police should be responsible for dealing a riot or natural disaster. If the military are best at the job, they should do it, and be given the necessary funds. If the police are best at the job, they should do it, and get the relevant funds. Period. Full stop. End of argument.
16. Where government borrows, some of the money is inevitably lent by foreigners. But there is a problem there, which is that money flowing into a country from abroad temporarily boosts living standards in the country. And that standard of living boost will be reversed if and when the money is repaid. That is politically unpopular, which makes the reversal difficult.
Put another way, the borrowing enables incumbent politicians to raise living standards while in office, while the mess is left for their successors to sort out.

Now for using fiscal stimulus on its own.
1. The “spend” part of “borrow and spend” is stimulatory, while the borrow part has the OPPOSITE EFFECT: it’s deflationary. Thus borrow and spend is a bit like throwing dirt over your car before cleaning it: bonkers.
2.  Crowding out: that is, fact that when government borrows, that tends to raise interest rates, which has a deflationary effect, which negates the whole object of the exercise: imparting stimulus. THE EXACT EXTENT of this crowding out is disputed, but to the extent that it is a problem, the central bank can easily counteract the undesirable effect by cutting interest rates – which it does by creating money and buying up government debt.
BUT HANG ON……… What’s going on here is that gcbm is creating money and spending it into the economy: i.e. it’s an admission that the correct policy is to merge monetary and fiscal policy!!!
Alternatively, to the extent that “borrow and spend” DOES WORK without a crowding out effect, there is another problem: what is the point of government borrowing something (i.e. money) when it can create money in infinite amounts any time it likes and at no cost? You ever heard of anything so daft?
3. It is sometimes argued that monetary policy (interest rate adjustments at any rate) can be made quickly, i.e. fiscal changes take longer to implement.
That point is irrelevant. The IMPORTANT question is TOTAL TIME LAG between the decision to implement a policy and the actual effect. I’ve seen eighteen months cited as the relevant figure for interest rate adjustments, whereas the evidence indicates that a significant proportion of the additional cash that wage earners find in their pay packets as a result of a reduction in employees’ contribution to a payroll tax reduction will be spent IMMEDIATELY. For the evidence, see here, here, here and here.
Also, in that fiscal policy consists of expanding the PUBLIC SECTOR, the effect ought to be pretty well IMMEDIATE. That is, if government decides to hire additional people, the effect comes just as quickly as people can be interviewed, and given the means to get on with whatever job they are doing.
4. There is disagreement amongst economists as to how effective monetary and fiscal policies are. That little problem can be solved by doing both policies at once. If one policy I much more effective than another, it doesn’t matter: the COMBINATION is guaranteed to have an effect. That is, helicoptering works.










Thursday, February 14, 2013

Tim Congdon is clueless.



I’ve made reference before on this blog to Tim Congdon’s ignorance on monetary matters. His latest blunder is to claim in the Financial Times that quantitative easing consists of the state borrowing from private banks and buying back government debt.
Wrong.
QE consists of the central bank creating money ex nihilo and buying back government debt.
His exact words (in a letter to the Financial Times) are thus.
“Circumstances can arise in which the banking system, and therefore the quantity of bank deposits, is shrinking because the private sector is repaying bank loans on a large scale. If so, the state needs to borrow from the banks and create new money. This is indeed the monetisation of public debt, a process naively (and inaccurately) characterised as “the printing of money”, and labelled “quantitative easing”…”.
How Congdon ever came to be made a professor of economics is a mystery.
But then (as the plebs have always known) there are plenty of idiots in high places.